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1. Introduction 
While the effects of EU membership on Austrian social policy 
basically confirm what has been expected (see below), it came as a 
surprise to most observers that EU social policy itself underwent a quite 
significant change, whose final effects are only to be seen in the future. 
Since EU social policy evolved to such a !arge degree after the 
Austrian membership application and decision, it seems necessary to 
give the reader an overview on its overall development (section 2). 
Subsequently, the expectations and realizations of social aspects of EU 
adhesion concerning direct effects (3) and indirect effects (4) will be 
summarized. Then the implications of this shall be analyzed along 
different redistributive dimensions (5). The final section presents 
conclusions and an outlook. 
2. The Development of EU Social Policy Before and 
After the Austrian Membership Decision 
The 1957 EEC-Treaty did not directly provide for a 
Europeanization of social policies since too many delegations had 
opposed this. 1 lt only contained a small number of concessions for the 
more interventionistdelegations, notably the provisions on equal pay for 
both sexes (Art. 119, EEC-Treaty) and the establishment of a "European 
Social Fund" (Art. 123-128, EEC-Treaty). The other provisions of the 
EEC-Treaty's title III, social policy, were rather solemn statements that 
did not empower the EEC to act. "Underwriting this arrangement was 
the relative feasibility of nation-state strategies for economic 
development in the first decades after World War II. The common 
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market, as it was constructed, was designed to aid and abet such national 
strategies, not transcend them."2 
Where necessary or functional for market integration, intervention 
in the social policy field was nevertheless implicitly allowed, via the so-
called subsidiary competence provisions (Art. 100 and 235, EEC-
Treaty). They provided, from the l 970s onwards, a backdoor for social 
policy harmonization at the EU-level. The necessary unanimous council 
votes, however, constituted high thresholds for joint action. Accor-
dingly, social regulation slowly became a corollary of the EC's market-
making activities. During the 1970s a persistent pro-social-regulation 
advocacy coalition together with functional pressures brought about a 
number of spillovers3 from market integration to social policy (which 
can only be crudely summarized here).4 
In the field of gender equality, the European Court of Justice 
became a major actor with its extensive interpretation of Article 119 of 
the EEC-Treaty. Matters such as equal pay and equal treatment of men 
and warnen at the workplace were finally even regulated at the EU level 
in directives.5 In the field of Labor law, a number of directives were 
adopted during the late l 970s ( on collective redundancies, on the 
transfer of undertakings, and on securing of workers' rights in cases of 
employer insolvency), and many more followed during the 1990s 
( worker information on conditions of work contract, working conditions 
of posted workers6 and atypical workers,7 parental leave, etc.). 
By then, the Single European Act had already come into force as the 
first major EEC-Treaty revision (in 1987). Like in the 1950s, an 
economic enterprise had been at the heart of a fresh impetus for 
European integration. But while the Internat Market Program had been 
solemnly put on track by the European Commission and the 
governments, social policy had again constituted a controversial issue: 
How much social state building should go along with even more far-
reaching market integration? In various, so-calledflanking policy areas, 
notably environmental and research policy, EEC competence had been 
formally extended. Not so for social policy: the delegations had not been 
willing to give the EEC a greater role in this field. Only two exceptions 
had been made to this general rule. Art. 118b of the EEC-Treaty had 
provided that "[t]he Commission shall endeavor to develop the dialogue 
between management and labor at European level which could, if the 
two sides consider it desirable, lead to relations based on agreement." 
The second and crucial concession had been Article 118a of the EEC-
Treaty on minimum harmonization related to health and safety of 
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workers. This one had provided an escape route out of the unanimity 
requirement that had blocked EC social policy in many instances. 8 lt had 
allowed, for the first time in European social policy, for directives based 
on only a qualified majority of the council members. This had been 
agreeable to all delegations because occupational health and safety was 
closely connected to the Interna! Market.9 Quite wrongly, the Thatcher 
government had not expected this perceivably technical issue to 
significantly facilitate social policy integration in the decade to come. 
In fact, the EEC increasingly intervened under the heading of worker 
health and safety. Directives included not only protection of workers 
exposed to emissions and loads, or protection against risks of chemical, 
physical, and biological agents at work (e.g. lead or asbestos). 10 Beyond 
these indeed more technical aspects, working conditions in a broader 
sense were also taken into consideration (e.g. working time). 
Although this list of EC social activities may-against the 
background of an absent social policy agenda in the original treaties (as 
opposed to the later Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties)-appear 
impressive at the first glance, the eclectic character of EC social policy 
is obvious if compared to national provisions. In the absence of a 
commonly accepted theory on which parts of the enterprises' social costs 
actually constitute a distortion of competition, the Community has 
pragmatically followed a step-by-step approach of suggesting selective 
harmonization of the disparate conditions which both enterprises and 
citizens find in the various member states of the Common Market. The 
Council, by contrast, often blocked directives suggested by the European 
Commission, at least before the Maastricht Treaty reforms. 
As mentioned above, there has been a significant change in the 
character of E(E)C 11 social policy since Austriajoined the EU, based on 
the Maastricht Treaty reforms. lt is true that the crucial innovations of 
this 1991 treaty were already known when Austria negotiated its 
membership. However, they only came into legal force by November 
1993 and did not have their full effect until they were integrated in the 
Amsterdam Treaty in late 1997. By the early 1990s, by contrast, EC 
social policy seemed in a complete stalemate. 
This is why social policy was one of the crucial areas in the 1991 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), set up to reform the EEC-Treaty. 
The originally envisaged extension of the provisions in the EEC social 
chapter could not be realized because of strong opposition from Great 
Britain. In order not to endanger the rest of the IGC's compromises, the 
UK was finally granted an exception (opt-out) from the social policy 
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measures agreed on by the rest of the member states. In the Protocol on 
Social Policy, appended to the renewed EEC-Treaty, the other (then 
eleven) member states were authorized to have recourse to the 
institutions, procedures, and mechanisms of the treaty for the purposes 
of implementing their Agreement on Social Policy .12 
This so-called Social Agreement represented a significant change in 
governance if compared to the earlier treaty provisions. There is now an 
explicit Community competence for a wide range of social policy issues, 
including working conditions, information and consultation of workers, 
equality between men and women with regard to labor market 
opportunities and treatment at work; and the integration of persons 
excluded from the labor market. Consequently, both the EU member 
states and the Community now share the power to act in the social 
realm. Action under the Social Agreement can in most areas even be 
taken under the supranational mode of qualified majority voting, e.g. in 
the area of information and consultation of workers as well as on 
working conditions. Unanimous decisions are restricted to social 
security and social protection of workers; protection of workers where 
their employment contract is terminated; representation and collective 
defense of the interests of workers and employers, including co-
determination; conditions of employment for third-country nationals 
legally residing in Community territory; and financial contributions for 
the promotion of employment and job creation. 
The Agreement in practice shows that the member states which had 
signed up for the Social Agreement were careful not to endanger the 
integration process as such, and had particularregard forthe unity ofEU 
law. Indeed, the Social Agreement was more frequently used as a legal 
basis only when it seemed highly probable that the UK would be bound 
by its effects as the new social directives came into force. The changes 
to the institutions and the financial consequences of the Agreement were 
kept as limited as possible. 13 
Nevertheless, to re-establish a single legal basis for EC social policy 
was a central social policy stake in the IGC in 1996-97 for all 
governments except the UK. The British government joined these 
ambitions after the defeat ofthe Conservatives by Labor in the elections 
of May 1997, and the inclusion of the Social Agreement into the EC-
Treaty (TEC) was agreed on at the Amsterdam Council in June 1996. 
That this would change the character of EC social policy to a large 
extent was, however, not yet known when Austria reflected on whether 
or not to become a member. 
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3. Social Aspects of Austrian EU Adhesion: 
Direct Eff ects in Theory and Practice 
The specific character of EU social policy, as described above for 
the early l 990s, suggested that becoming an EU member would not 
legally require any major changes in the structure of the Austrian 
welfare state. The first reason was that by the early l 990s, the EU 
impinged only marginally in the most costly aspect of national welfare 
systems, i.e. social security. lt is true that various principles restricted 
the individual member states' sovereignty over some welfare issues 
(above all, the freedom of movement of workers and equal treatment of 
EU-nationals at the workplace, as weil as the co-ordination of national 
social security systems to assure the welfare of migrant workers). As 
lang as these principles were respected, however, all basic charac-
teristics of social security were left to be decided at the national level 
(most importantly, the number and type of insurance or benefit schemes, 
beneficiaries, as weil as the type and level of allowances). 14 
The second reason an EU membership would not require major 
changes was that, while the EU' s Council of Ministers had been more 
active in the field of labor law (see above), these measures were so 
eclectic that many issues of national labor law were not even touched. 
Furthermore, they typically followed the principle of minimum 
harmonization, so member states were allowed to keep or introduce 
higher standards at any point. Since Austria considered itself a 
particularly advanced welfare state, little attention was paid to these 
minimum standards and some were surprised when it became clear that 
various Austrian laws needed a lifting of standards in order to comply 
with EU social standards (see below). 
Finally, a third reason why social policy played only a small role in 
the pre-accession debates was that most adaptations were needed and 
many indeed were already effectuated weil before Austrian EU 
membership. lt should be mentioned that the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area (in effect after 1 J anuary 1994) had already 
covered most of the EU' s social policy measures. 
As a consequence of this state of affairs, it was uncontroversial 
among politicians as weil as social scientists that the existing EU social 
laws would not directly impinge on the quality of the Austrian welfare 
state after EU accession. In actual fact, the only contested aspect in that 
regard concerned the prohibition of night work for warnen. While the 
Austrian Constitutional Court had only in early 1993 deemed the 
prohibition offemale night work as constitutional and well-founded due 
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to the presumed particular need for protection of warnen with double 
obligations (job and family), it is crucial to mention that most women's 
organizations actually did not consider abandoning this ban as a 
lowering of social standards. In any case, long before Austrian EU 
membership, the European Court of Justice had interpreted the Equal 
Treatment Directive's basic principle of equal working conditions to 
mean that a unilateral restriction of nightwork for warnen was discrimi-
natory .15 In principle, this had to be accepted as part of the EU law, but 
in the Austrian membership negotiations, an exception clause was 
agreed on with the EU. Therefore, the ban on nightwork for warnen 
would have tobe abolished only by 2001. 16 
All other discrepancies between EU gender law and relevant 
Austrian provisions were not contested with a view to their progressive 
social character but, if at all, for their costs to employers. lt should be 
mentioned that following a ruling of 6 December 1990 by the Austrian 
Constitutional Court on the discriminatory quality of unequal pension 
ages for women and men, a number of compensatory measures for 
warnen (whose pension age was subsequently lifted) were agreed on 
under the leadership of then Minister for Women Affairs Johanna 
Dohnal. In the framework of a so-called women' s package, the equal 
treatment law was also reformed in December 1992. Since, in view of 
the European Economic Area and of possible later membership, EU 
rapprochement was already considered crucial, important parts of the 
EC' s laws were incorporated into Austrian law already then. 17 This 
included the prohibition of indirect discrimination (unequal treatment on 
the basis of a presumably objective criterion that, in fact, disadvantages 
warnen more than men) and of unequal pay for work of equal value (as 
opposed to equal work only). While these were important improvements 
to the Austrian equal treatment legislation, it should be noted that other 
Austrian provisions (e.g. on gender neutraljob offers and on a balanced 
quota in public service) were already more favorable for warnen than 
EU gender legislation. However, the legal adaptation to some details of 
EU legislation (most notably the amount of penalties for breach of the 
equal treatment principle) was not effectuated as and when it should 
have been. 18 
Other important aspects where labor law had tobe adapted to EU 
standards include most notably health and safety at the workplace. The 
relevant EU directives went in part far beyond what was known in 
worker protection before Austrian membership, e.g. concerning digital 
display units. How to implement these rules raised manifold conflicts 
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between parties and social partners. A relevant law would lang have 
been required for the European Economic Area but did not come into 
force until EU membersbip. 19 
4. Social Aspects of Austrian EU Adhesion: 
Indirect Eff ects in Theory and Practice 
As outlined above, tbe expectation tbat existing EC social laws 
would not harm Austrian social standards (but ratber improve some) was 
not controversial at all. By contrast, two otber issues were extremely 
contested in tbe Austrian pre-membersbip debate: tbe role of decision 
gaps in EU social policy (1 ), and tbe social relevance of EU policies 
outside tbe proper social policy realm and tbeir impact on national social 
policy-making (2). Tbe contested issues bence concerned socialpolitical 
aspects in tbe wider sense, in contrast to the narrower perspective of 
looking exclusively at tbe standards of EU social law. 
1) Same argued tbat it was necessary to look not only at wbat tbe 
EC did in social policy, but also at wbat it didn't do (or: bad not done, 
by tben).20 Tbis referred above all to tbe fact tbat tbe Interna! Market 
Program effectuated economic liberalization witbout always securing 
tbat corresponding social provisions were also in place. Tbe most 
frequently cited example was tbe question of wbicb labor law to apply 
in cases of posted workers. Sbould Portuguese construction workers on 
German sites be paid according to Portuguese rules? If so, tbe German 
economy Uust like tbe Austrian and otbers) would suffer from 
significant competitive disadvantages, and workers at tbe same construc-
tion site would be treated unequally because of tbeir nationality. Tbis 
problem bad not been regulated in a satisfactory way under tbe various 
EU and international rules. Nevertbeless, tbe relevant 1991 European 
Commission proposal was blocked in tbe Council until weil after 
Austrian membersbip. 
Anotber example for a side effect of tbe Internat Market on social 
policy, whicb was not counterbalanced by EU social policy for a lang 
time, was tbe issue of European works councils (institutions for 
enterprise-level information and consultation of workers). Witb 
increased Europeanization, tbe national laws on worker information and 
consultation bad de facto become void of substance. Transnational 
enterprises escaped from tbeir scope because tbeir important decisions 
were taken outside tbe national realm. Tberefore, only European works 
councils could guarantee tbat the status qua ante of worker participation 
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was being upheld in the unified European market. Nevertheless, a 
Commission draft directive from 1980( !) was waiting tobe adopted until 
late 1994.21 
Although the issue of decision gaps in EU social policy22 was much 
debated within the EU,23 it was not always welcome to bring it up within 
Austria, where the government had adopted a strategy based on overt 
advertising for EU membership and not on discussing those aspects 
where the EU's performance may possibly not (yet) have been optimal. 
In this context, the publication of an intense 550 page study on various 
potential social policy effects of EU membership, elaborated for the 
Austrian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, was not allowed.24 
After a two-thirds majority of the Austrian population opted for EU 
membershi p in the referendum of 12 June 1994, both the directi ves on 
posted workers and on European works councils were adopted. The new 
possibility for majority voting in many social affairs and the new 
decision mies involving the EU-level social partners (adopted in 
Maastricht without the UK and extended in the Amsterdam Treaty to all 
member states) had the effect of finally unblocking almost all 
Commission draft directives that had not been adopted during the 1980s 
and early 1990s.25 Despite the Euro-sceptic initial assessments of most 
academic commentators,26 the social dimension of the Interna! Market 
as developed by the European Commission was finally implemented27 --
although with great delay compared to the economic liberalization 
pro gram. 
2) Another very contested aspect in the discussion of the social 
consequences of an Austrian EU membership was the potential 
relevance of EU policies outside the proper social policy realm for 
national social policy-making. In particular, this concerned the libera-
lization and competition-oriented character of most European integra-
tion measures which might draw attention to possible competitive 
disadvantages stemming from higher social costs. lt might also reinforce 
the public discourse on social spending cuts, which continued to be 
enforced despite an ever growing economic prosperity and which, in the 
end, only served the well-to-do.28 The discussion also raised the issue of 
the Maastricht convergence criteria for Economic and Monetary Union 
which pointed to the harmonization of monetary and fiscal indicators 
without paying attention to other classic macro-economic policy goals, 
notably employment rates. 29 
Although the need for budgetary consolidation had already been 
widely acknowledged in Austria during the early 1990s, the additional 
169 
external justification of the EU membership was necessary to push 
through the specific short-term consolidation measures adopted during 
the second half of the l 990s. As an EU member, Austria was suddenly 
underthe critical supervision of the European Commission and the other 
member states' governments. That the Austrian government wanted to 
be among the first countries to join the Economic and Monetary Union 
also created an immediate need for cutting the budget deficit from 6.2% 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ( 1995) to the mere 3% allowed by the 
Maastricht criteria. The public debt had tobe brought down from 69.2% 
(1995) to 60%. However, while the EU was clearly useful as an external 
justifier for budgetary consolidation, one should also keep in mind that 
"an appreciable part of the high budget deficit recorded in 1995 was 
attributable to the costs of accession; according to Commission estima-
tes, around 2 percentage points of the total 5.2 percent deficit."30 
Already in 1995 and 1996, two austerity packages were adopted by 
the then grand coalition government of Social Democrats and Christian 
Democrats. These packages consisted of some hundred measures 
touching key aspects of social policy (without, however, changing the 
structure of Austria' s welfare state itself). In some cases, these measures 
hit low income earners, the unemployed, and single mothers particularly 
hard, while transfer payments which also benefited those with higher 
incomes (like subsidies for owned housing, some family transfers) were 
hardly touched at all. 31 Quite obviously, though, it is not possible to 
measure the influence of EU policies in this process or to know which 
strategies for budgetary consolidation Austrian actors would possibly 
have chosen outside the Union. 
5. Developments Along Different 
Redistributive Dimensions 
According to the classic definition by T.H. Marshall, social policy 
is the use of political power to supersede, supplement, or modify 
operations of the economic system in order to achieve results which the 
economic system would not achieve on its own. 32 More specifically, in 
a welfare state such operations include the redistribution of money, 
rights, or influence. By differentiating explicitly between various lines 
of redistribution in the Austrian welfare state, it may be easier to 
summarize the effects of Europeanization on Austria five years after her 
entry into the EU. 
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The most crucial dimensions along which one can conceptualize the 
impact of the EU on the Austrian welfare state seem tobe the following: 
redistribution between high income and Iow income earners ( 1 ), between 
employers and employees (2), between the employed and the unem-
ployed (3), between the sexes (4), and between generations (5).33 
(1) Redistribution between high income and low income earners can 
primarily be captured in terms of the Ievel of financial transfers in cases 
of unemployment or Jack of income for other reasons (e.g. invalidity). 
lt is very difficult (and impossible in this chapter) to quantify the 
changes effectuated during recent years, aggregating across different 
insurance systems and individual benefits. As mentioned above, 
however, it is clear that Austrian austerity packages have included some 
measures that particularly effected the poorer part of the population ( e.g. 
reduced levels of and restricted access to unemployment compensation, 
increased co-payment levels in health care, non-valorization of benefits 
in the general care allowance system). Furthermore, the proportion of 
Austrian wealth spent for social welfare has been decreasing since the 
mid-1990s (1995: 29.8%; 1998: 28.5%).34 While this was in practice a 
choice taken at the national level, commentators argued that this choice 
might not have been politically feasible without the external justifier 
provided by the Maastricht convergence criteria. 35 The EU itself has no 
binding mies on how to fight poverty and social exclusion, only a 
number of recommendations (from the early 1990s) and some discussion 
documents (rapidly increasing in recent years). 
(2) Concerning the relationship between employers and employees, 
EU intervention touches on the dimension of employee rights and 
protection. As outlined above, a number of specific standards of worker 
protection had to be Iifted during the implementation of relevant EC 
directives (notably in the field of health and safety at the workplace, and 
concerning parental leave, working time, and other working conditions ). 
In all these fields, dense national rules had already existed in Austria. 
Although they often went beyond what was demanded by the relevant 
EU counterparts, amendments were needed to comply with higher EU 
standards in some particular details. Furthermore, some specific new 
rights were created at the EU level, most notably, the right to be 
informed about and consulted on important enterprise-related decisions 
if one is employed in a multinational enterprise (as defined in the 
relevant EU directive on the European works councils). While all these 
aspects improved rights or created new ones for employees, they also 
accounted for higher corresponding costs for employers. 
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Beyond this, there are also the indirect effects of EU membership 
which are hard to measure. In any case, multiple examples show that 
Austrian employer representatives cite lower standards and lower costs 
in other countries within the EU' s Internal Market in order to gain 
savings at home-as the highest government official in the field had 
feared before membership. 36 While outright cutbacks seem not to have 
occurred so far, 37 it is impossible to know for sure how much this 
pressure affected the level of Austrian labor law via potential advances 
that were not realized. When this essay was written (2000), the new 
center-right government had just moved the competencies for worker 
protection from the social to the economic ministry, and cutbacks were 
on the agenda. 
(3) Another important dimension of de facto redistribution in 
modern welfare states is that between the employed and the unemployed. 
This refers to efforts to create jobs and to improve placement services 
to speed up transfer into employment. As expected, EU membership 
brought about beneficial effects in terms of overall budgetary means. 
Since the European Social Fund (ESF) co-finances the active labor 
market policies of all member states, accession to the EU led to an 
increase in the resources available for such projects. 38 At the same time, 
the leeway for unilateral national action withered away since the major 
part of domestic funds had tobe used for co-funding projects accepted 
under the ESF schemes.39 
Since Austria almost directly adopted the EU's priorities, the 
Union' s innovative employment policy, which in recent years went hand 
in hand with ESF activity, became very important. The 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty added a chapter on employment policy to the EC-Treaty. Articles 
125 to 130 now specify how the "Member states and the Community 
shall ... work towards developing a coordinated strategy for employ-
ment and particularly for promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable 
workforce and labor markets responsive to economic change." The 
member states "shall regard promoting employment as a matter of 
common concern and shall coordinate their action in this respect within 
the Council."40 Without transferring any specific powers to the Council 
ofMinisters, this provision aims to redirect the member states' hitherto 
largely independent actions towards mutual adaptation. · This is 
encouraged in a coordination procedure (set out in Article 128 EC-
Treaty) that was already informally practiced before the Amsterdam 
Treaty (in the so-called Essen process41 ). 
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The European Council now monitors the employment situation in 
the Community, and draws its conclusions from ajoint annual report by 
the Council and the Commission. On the basis of these conclusions, the 
EC Council of Ministers draws up guidelines to be followed by the 
member states. Subsequently, each member state must report "the prin-
cipal measures taken to implement its employment policy in the light 
of' the Council's guidelines for employment.42 The Council examines 
whether the member states implement policies according to the 
guidelines for employment; the Council then may make recommen-
dations to member states "if it considers it appropriate in the light of that 
examination. "43 The joint annual report by the Council and the Commis-
sion to the European Council, concerning the employment situation in 
the Community and the implementation of the guidelines for employ-
ment, closes the cycle by serving as the relevant input for the next 
annual employment policy conclusions of the European Council. 
According to a decision taken at the so-called Luxembourg Jobs 
Summit in November 1997, the European employment strategy is built 
on four main pillars: employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability, and 
equal opportunities. Every year, a set of guidelines are adopted for each 
of the pillars, which set out a number of specific targets for member 
states to achieve in their employment policies. These employment policy 
guidelines are transposed into concrete and administrative measures by 
each member state through a National Action Plan for Employment 
(NAP). 44 
On the one hand, Austria welcomed all these activities as a fresh 
impetus for her labor market and employment policy. On the other hand, 
money for activities outside the EU priorities became ever scarcer. At 
the same time, the quality of some retraining and reintegration measures 
seemed to suffer, at least in some instances. The new framing of 
employment policy in terms of employability, the goal of including at 
least 20% of all unemployed in retraining measures (in principle a good 
strategy), and the obligation to report periodically on achievements and 
current unemployment figures may have prompted a system in which 
ever more Iong-term unemployed are included in ever more short-term 
training programs with ever less practical effect (except for erasing 
those covered by such programs from the statistic of long-term 
unemployment). 
(4) Concerning redistribution between the sexes, both rights and 
money (notably via the social security systems) are crucial. Equal 
treatment rights are granted in various EC labor law directives. They 
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have brought important innovations to the Austrian status quo (see 
above). Redistribution of wealth is more difficult to analyze along the 
gender dimension. However, commentators point to the fact that various 
aspects (e.g. in the pension reforms) of the austerity packages were 
exercised with a view to budget consolidation work to the detriment of 
women, in particular.45 
(5) Redistribution between generations happens notably via the 
pension system. The EU has, at least to date, no binding rules in this 
field (exceptions concem the aspects ofnon-discrimination, in particular 
of other EU nationals, and women). As outlined above, the various 
austerity packages, which aimed at (and succeeded in) propelling 
Austria to become an early member of the Economic and Monetary 
Union, included some important reforms in this area. However, it should 
be mentioned that spending on the elderly has extremely increased both 
before EU adhesion and after, due mainly to demographic factors. 
Considering that the Austrian govemment' s net spending on the elderly 
is roughly twice its overall deficit and approximately one fifth of the 
central government's budget (some 38 percent of all social expendi-
ture),46 and that Austria is thus well above the average EU spending in 
this field,47 steps to close this gap are considered indispensable. The 
misbalance between the generations can hardly be denied even by those 
who try to block reforms. This makes the role of the EU in legitimating 
these changes seem smaller than, for example, with the redistribution 
between rich and poor. 
6. Conclusions and Outlook 
All in all, the effects of EU membership on the Austrian welfare 
state did not bring any major surprises within the first five years. Rather, 
de facto developments confirmed scholarly expectations. One surprise 
was that the EC was, after all, capable of closing the labor law gaps 
created by the initial Jack of social dimension in the Interna! Market 
Program of the mid-1980s.48 In any case, the basic setup of national 
social policy was not touched upon, as expected and discussed before 
1995. Some labor law standards had to be lifted in order to comply with 
EU norms, but most aspects of Austrian social law stayed as they were. 
The more indirect effects on the national welfare state cannot be 
analyzed as easily as the direct ones. In instances such as those outlined 
above, EU policies outside the narrow realm of the social have a certain 
impact on national welfare issues. However, it is impossible to discern 
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the exact degree ofthis influence (as opposed to the changes in national 
ideology or government, internationalization in general, or the changes 
in national demand due to different circumstances, e.g. demographics). 
One cannot really know what kind of budgetary reform the Austrian 
grand coalition government, in office during the first five years of EU 
membership, would have adopted if the EU had not provided an external 
justifier. One can only try to analyze the discourses observable before 
and after 1995, but no hard scientific method is available. Just because 
these indirect effects cannot be analyzed scientifically, though, it would 
be a mistake to simply ignore their existence at all. 
lt is important to stress that even at the turn of the millennium 
national influences are still much more decisive in welfare state reform 
than supranational ones. In other words, a national government with 
preferences other than welfare and social justice can induce many more 
relevant changes than the EU membership could bring about. As 1 
pointed out almost a decade ago, this policy would even be easier within 
the EU. The EU' s rather neo-liberal bias can help to justify such measu-
res, and its non-transparent character can serve to blur real responsibi-
lity. (The EU can easily be used for such blame avoidance since the 
distribution of competencies, especially but not exclusively in social 
policy, is not transparent for the uninitiated.) Finally, such a government 
can block many social policy initiatives at the EU level, either alone 
(where unanimity is still the rule) or with ready coalition partners, such 
as the UK. While EU membership per se never constituted a profound 
danger to the national welfare state (for most problematic issues 
appropriate measures for countersteering seemed, at least potentially, 
available ), the twin conditions of EU membership and a welfare-adverse 
national government in Austria could easily alter the traditional social 
policy balance in a profound manner.49 
For this reason, the forthcoming five years of EU membership may 
possibly be more interesting to watch than the last ones. This is further 
underlined by the latest developments in the so-called social dimension 
of European integration. Currently, the preferred method of EU 
intervention in social affairs (in the wider sense) is changing rather 
fundamentally. As previously outlined through the example of employ-
ment policy, other means than regulative action are now being 
employed, and similar patterns shall be used for fighting poverty and for 
social security reform. This new method of open coordination is based 
on benchmarking, advertising best practice, establishing hegemonic 
discourses, and peer pressure at the EU level, but leaves regulative 
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action to the national and sub-national levels. What actually results from 
such "neo-voluntaristic"50 social policy-making in terms of concrete 
actions crucially depends, once again, on the individual national 
governments. For better or for worse (and this will differ from country 
to country), the EU will help the specific governments in office to more 
easily effectuate reforms, even against the protest of some national 
interests. 
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